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HOARDING OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES: 





Motivated by the observed international reserve hoarding behavior in the post-1997 crisis 
period, we explore the Mrs Machlup’s wardrobe hypothesis and the related keeping up with 
the Joneses argument. It is conceived that, in addition to psychological reasons, holding a 
relatively high level of international reserves reduces the vulnerability to speculative attacks 
and promotes growth. A stylized model is constructed to illustrate this type of hoarding 
behavior. The relevance of the keeping up with the Joneses effect is examined using a few 
plausible empirical specifications and data from 10 East Asian economies. Panel-based 
regression results are suggestive of the presence of the Joneses effect; especially in the post-
1997 crisis period. Individual economy estimation results, however, show that the Joneses 
effect varies across economies. 
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1. Introduction 
The 1997 financial crisis in East Asia underscores the importance of capital account 
variability and the role of flow reversal on triggering off a crisis. Economies in the crisis-
inflicted region appear to have adjusted their policy behavior and have sharply boosted their 
international reserves in the aftermath of the crisis. For instance, China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia 
and Taiwan; the economies that are commonly mentioned in the recent discussion/debate of the 
extraordinary and puzzling accumulation of international reserves in the new millennium, see 
their international reserves increased by, respectively, 388%, 135%, 119%, 138% and 137% 
between 2000 and 2005.
1  
  The steep increase in international reserves definitely helps these economies to deter 
speculative attacks. Nonetheless, the dramatic jumps in international reserve holdings raise 
concerns in both policy and academic circles. In general, it is perceived that some of these 
economies are holding international reserves at a level that is difficult to be rationalized by 
conventional factors. For instance, one traditional indicator of international reserve adequacy is 
the reserves-to-imports ratio and the rule of thumb is to maintain international reserves worth, 
say, three months of imports. 
Again, consider China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan – their holdings of 
international reserves are much higher than the three-month benchmark. Specifically, at the end 
of 2005, the international reserves held by these economies cover, respectively, 14.93, 19.33, 
9.66, 7.36, and 16.65 months of imports. While excessive international reserves offer some 
benefits, they carry substantial negative implications for both domestic economies and global 
imbalances, and thus, can be a serious threat to the stability of the world economy. 
Existing theories offer a few reasons for holding international reserves. One common 
explanation is the precautionary demand motivated by trade financing considerations.
2 The 
recent literature has extended the precautionary motive and considers accumulation of 
international reserves a policy to avoid crisis-induced output losses and investment contractions.
3 
                                                 
1   Based on data from the April 2006 IFS data CD. 
2   See, for example, Grubel (1971) for a survey of the pre-1970 studies. Flood and Marion 
(2002) review the theory and provide some recent empirical evidence. Genberg et al. (2005) 
discuss some specifics related to Asia. 
3   See, for example, Aizenman et al. (forthcoming), Jeanne and Rancière (2006), and Lee 
(2004).   2
Conditions in the financial market are also deemed important determinants of the holding of 
international reserves. For instance, the popular Greenspan-Guidotti rule recommends that 
developing economies should hold international reserves to cover short-term external debts. In 
general, it is advisable to cover the one year amortized value of various types of liabilities over a 
wide range of possible outcome.
4 Apparently, these factors do not fully explain the surge in 
international reserves witnessed in the new millennium. 
In a series of articles Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2005) argue that the large 
hoarding of international reserves by East Asian economies is a natural consequence of the 
presence of a revived Bretton Woods system in the region. In essence, these economies adopt the 
mercantilist approach, pursue the export-led growth strategy followed by the post-war Europe 
and Japan, and, hence, accumulate international reserves. According to their view, international 
reserve accumulation is a by-product of the development strategy that promotes exports with an 
undervalued currency. Aizenman and Lee (2005), however, find that even though the 
mercantilist motive is confirmed by the data, it has little economic significance in explaining the 
buildup of international reserves in the post-crisis era. 
In the current study, we explore an idea advanced by Machlup (1966) and assess the 
extent to which his idea is relevant for explaining the international reserve accumulation 
behavior of some East Asian economies. Fritz Machlup, after examining some measures of 
international reserves, argued that the observed holding patterns could not be explained by 
reasons offered “by either theorists or practitioners.” Instead, he suggested monetary authorities’ 
hoarding of international reserves can be driven by non-fundamental factors. Specifically, he 
used his wife’s need for dresses as a metaphor to exemplify the monetary authorities’ desire for 
more and more international reserves.  
Apparently, the recent ascent in the holding of international reserves and some related 
official remarks lend credibility to the Mrs Machlup’s Wardrobe analogy. For instance, an 
official in the Korea’s central bank said “(T)here is no such thing as too much foreign 
international reserves.” On China’s international reserve holding, a Chinese official argued that 
                                                 
4   The rule follows from the former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan’s comments 
on Pablo Guidotti’s insight on the role of external debts in 1999. See Greenspan (1999). Guidotti 
is a former Deputy Minister of Finance of Argentina. de Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001), 
on the other hand, argue that the domestic liability represented by money supply should also be 
considered.   3
there is “no unified benchmark on the appropriate amount of forex international reserve a 
country should hold in both theory and practice” and “it could not be said to be “excessive” or 
“deficient.”
5 The official statements usually point to the need of building up international 
reserves to fend off external shocks and speculative attacks but do not offer a target level based 
on fundamental considerations. Even with the anecdotal evidence, is it reasonable to assert that 
the insatiable appetite of central banks for international reserves is the sole reason for the recent 
buildup of international reserves? 
We postulate that the international reserve accumulation process pertaining to the Mrs 
Machlup’s Wardrobe metaphor may serve some relevant economic purposes. It is quite non-
controversial to state that, on the other things being equal basis, international reserves help 
absorb unexpected (external) shocks and smooth current and capital account imbalances. The 
crisis experience and the development after the crisis appear to be consistent with the notion of 
accumulating international reserves to forestall future speculative attacks. The question, of 
course, is how high the level of international reserves an economy has to hold? 
On his wife’s dress need, Machlup (1966, p. 26) suggests that it depends “on the Joneses 
with whom she wishes to keep up.” That is, besides some fundamental considerations, the 
buildup of international reserves depends on the behavior of neighboring economies. Ignoring 
the question of why Mrs Machlup has to keep up with the Joneses for a moment, the (implicit) 
rivalry among economies may give raise to competitive hoarding mechanism that pushes the 
holding of international reserves to a level that is difficult to be explained by only traditional 
considerations. 
Besides the pure psychological desire to feel good and not to be perceived as inferior, 
there are a few reasons why economies would like to keep up with their peers. Remarks by 
Feldstein (1999) and Fischer (1999), for example, offer some insight on the keeping up with the 
Joneses motivation. After the crisis, these two noted economists observed that economies with a 
higher level of international reserves survived the East Asian financial crisis better than those 
with a lower level. Thus, a level of international reserves that is relatively higher than your 
neighbors may diffuse the speculative pressure on your own economy and divert it to the 
neighboring economies and, hence, reduce the chance of bearing the full cost of an attack. In 
other words, when a financial crisis is brewing in the region, if two economies have similar 
                                                 
5   Day and Choi (2004) and Xinhua News Agency (2004).    4
economic fundamentals, the one with a higher level of international reserves is less likely to be 
attacked and more likely to survive the crisis. 
Another reason for keeping up with the Joneses is that international reserves can have a 
positive impact on an economy’s output prospects. If the level of international reserves is a 
barometer of financial heath, an economy has an additional incentive to keeping up with the 
Joneses to position itself to compete for international capital and foreign direct investment, 
which tend to have a level of productivity proficiency higher than the domestic capital. For 
developing economies, the output effect of international reserves also arises from their ability to 
reduce costs of borrowing in the international capital market and provide needed liquidity when 
there is a reversal of capital flows. A relatively high level of international reserves will, thus, 
provide a catalyst for economic growth and enhance output prospects, which in turn will improve 
the market sentiment and, hence, reduce an economy’s vulnerability to attack.  
In the remaining part of the paper, we use a stylized model to illustrate the demand for 
international reserves when Mrs Machlup takes the Joneses into consideration. Specifically, we 
assume that an economy’s vulnerability to speculative attacks depends on, among other things, 
international reserves held by other economies. The exercise also underscores the international 
reserve’s feedback on output potential and the related Joneses effect. Further, we take the idea to 
the data from a group of East Asian economies and investigate whether these economies display 
the keeping up with the Joneses behavior. 
 
2.  International Reserve Hoarding and Keeping up with the Joneses 
In this section, we present a sequence of models to illustrate the demand for international 
reserves in the presence of keeping up with the Joneses due to a) the consideration of speculative 
attack, and b) the feedback effect of international reserves on output. The first model serves as a 
benchmark, the second one modifies the speculative attack probability to accommodate the 
notion of keeping up with the Joneses, and the third one introduces a positive output effect of 
international reserves.  
  A caveat is in order. The following discussion highlights two possible situations that lead 
to the keeping up with the Joneses effect. Similar to the implicit psychological motivation in 
Machlup (1966), any mechanisms that give rise to competitive hoarding behavior will generate 
the keeping up with the Joneses effect described in this and the next section.   5
 
2.1 The  Benchmark  Model 
  In this subsection, we derive the baseline demand for international reserves. The basic 
structure is essentially the model used by Aizenman et al. (forthcoming). A few simplifications 
were implemented to reduce the complexity of the model and highlight the issue we would like 
to analyze. For this reason, we refer interested readers to Aizenman et al. (forthcoming) for a 
more detailed description. 
We consider a two-period model. In period one the economy has an output endowment Y1. 
Without loss of generality, the initial endowment is normalized to 1; that is Y1 = 1. The output in 
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The random output shocks δ  and ε  are not necessarily the same. The probability that the 
economy suffers from output losses due to a speculative attack is p.  For simplicity, we ignore 
attacks that do not have any output implications.
6 For the benchmark model, we assume p is 
given by  
           
R
B
p α φ + = ,     0 α > ,                 (2)         
where R  and B  are, respectively, the level of international reserve holding and the amount of 
foreign borrowing in period 1. In essence, (2) assumes the probability of suffering an attack that 
leads to an output loss is inversely related to the level of international reserves and directly 
proportional to the level of indebtedness.  α  is a scale parameter to ensure that the output loss 
probability p stays within the legitimate region. φ  is a catch-all parameter representing other 
factors that affect the attack probability. We label the occurrence of 1 δ +  a good state and that of 
1 ε −  a bad state. 
During the first period, given the output Y1, the economy makes decisions regarding 
consumption ( 1 C ), international reserve accumulation (R ) and borrowing in the international 
capital market (B ), and is subject to the budget constraint  
                                                 
6   It means the probability (1 – p) includes these events: 1) no speculative attack; 2) a 
speculative attack has been neutralized or defended without output loss; 3) any other speculative 
attacks that do not induce an output drop. Also, we ignore output losses due to factors other than 
speculative attacks.   6
  R B C − + =1 1 .          ( 3 )  
The international borrowing carries a contractual interest rate r and, thus, the required repayment 
in period 2 is (1+r)B.  
Because of a possible default in the second period, the economy faces a credit ceiling that 
limits the amount it can borrow internationally. The credit ceiling can be determined as follows. 
In the case of default, we assume the international lender can confiscate a share of Y2, denoted by 
θY2; 0 < θ < 1, from the economy. However, the international lender does not have access to the 
economy’s international reserves. If the repayment (1+r)B is larger than the penalty θY2, then the 
economy has an incentive to default. Thus, the international lender would determine the lending 
amount knowing that the repayment he is going to receive in period 2 is 
  ] ; ) 1 [( 2 Y B r MIN S θ + = ,          ( 4 )  
where  [.,.] MIN  is the minimum operator. Let the (international) risk-free interest rate be * r . It is 
assumed that r > * r .
7 Under risk neutrality, the expected repayment is given by 
[] B r S E *) 1 ( + = .           ( 5 )  
The credit ceiling, B , faced by the economy is the level of debt that will lead to a default in both 
good and bad states. Thus, it is given by 
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The credit ceiling is increasing with the positive production shock δ  and the ability to confiscate 
θ, and is decreasing with the adverse production shock ε , the probability of an attack that leads 
to output losses p, and the risk free rate  * r . 
Assuming a) (1 ) (1 ) rB θ δ + ≤+ , b)  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ε θ − > + B r  with the probability q, and c) the 
international reserves earn an interest rate of  * r , the budget constraint for the second period is 
given by
8            
                                                 
7   The Appendix shows that the economy has to pay a premium in the international capital 
market; that is r > * r  
8   The economy defaults in the bad state if  ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ε θ ε − − < + − − B r , which can be 
simplified to the condition  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ε θ − > + B r . Thus, q is the default probability under the bad 
state and depends on the adverse output shock ε .   7
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where  g C , 2 ,  b C , 2 ,  d b C , , 2  are, respectively, the levels of consumption in period 2 when the 
economy is in the good state, in the bad state with no default, and in the bad state and defaulted.  
The economy has to choose the levels of consumption  1 C  and  2 C  to maximize its 
representative consumer’s expected utility, which is given by 
12 , 2 , 2 , ,
1
(.) (1 ) [(1 ) ]
1
gb b d UC p Cpq C q C
ρ
⎡⎤ =+ − + − + ⎣⎦ +
,     (8) 
where ρ is the discount rate and is assumed to be larger than the risk-free interest rate  * r . Taking 
the output loss probability (2) and the budget constraints (3) and (7) into consideration, the task 
is to maximize the expected utility  (.) U  subject to the conditions (2), (3), and (7). In solving the 
utility maximization problem, we should obtain the optimal levels of borrowing and international 
reserves along with the optimal consumption path. 
To simplify the presentation, we follow Aizenman et al. (forthcoming) and assume that 
the economy has a discount rate high enough to set the borrowing at the ceiling level B . When B 
= B , the contractual (not the expected) repayment is 
( ) δ θ + = + = 1 ) 1 ( B B r B ,            ( 9 a )  
and the expected utility  (.) U  can be written as 
      (.) BB U = ()() () ( ) () ( ) {}
1
11 1 1 * 1
1
BR rRp θ δθ δ ε
ρ
=+− + − + ++ − − +
+
. (9b) 
Thus, the first order condition with respect to R is  
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which equates the marginal cost of increasing one unit of R in period one to the resulting 
(discounted) benefit obtained in period two.  
Next, we derive  BB
dB
dR
=  and  BB
dp
dR
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Thus, the optimal level of international reserves is 
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The subscript “b” indicates that the expression is going to be used as a benchmark for 
comparison. From (12), it can be verified that the hoarding of international reserves is a) 
positively related to () δ ε + , the benefit of not being attacked and θ, the share of output being 
confiscated when it defaults, and b) negatively related to (* ) r ρ − , the opportunity cost and φ , 
the catch-all parameter that determines the economy’s vulnerability. It is also noted that B  is 
positively related to  b R  since B  is negatively related to p (equation (6)) and p is negatively 
related to R (equation (2)). 
  
2.2  The Joneses 
To capture the idea of “keeping up with the Joneses,” we modify the probability that the 
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,  ,0 , α β >        ( 1 3 )  
where the subscript “J” indicates the presence of the Joneses effect.  0 R %  is the average of 
international reserves held by its peer group (the Joneses) at period 0.
9  
Equation (13) incorporates the effect of international reserves held by other economies. 
It captures the notion that, ceteris paribus, speculators tend to attack an economy with a 
relatively low level of international reserves, which are powerful ammunition against 
speculative attacks. In additional to its own level of international reserves, an economy has to be 
aware of its relative position among its peer group. Attacks can be triggered by self-fulfilling 
expectations that are not related to fundamentals and speculators will look for a victim that has a 
relatively (rather than an absolutely) high level of vulnerability. Lagged rather than current 
international reserves in other economies are considered because current information about other 
                                                 
9   Strictly speaking, the model is extended to a three-period model. However, the period 0 is 
added to accommodate  0 R %  and it has no implications for other aspects of the model.   9
economies’ international reserves is typically hard to obtain.
10 Indeed, Mrs Machlup’s desire for 
dresses is likely to be instigated by seeing her contemporaries’ collection. 
  With the output loss probability specified by (13) rather than (2), the demand for 
international reserves in the presence of the Joneses effect can be derived by maximizing the 
expected utility  (.) U  in (8) subject to the conditions (13), (3), and (7). We follow a similar 
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and the corresponding first order condition is given by 
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 Similar  to  b R  in (12), the demand for international reserves in the presence of the Joneses 
increases with () δ ε +  and θ, and decreases with (* ) r ρ −  and φ . Through their impact on the 
attack probability, the international reserves held by others have a positive implication for an 
economy’s own hoarding of international reserves. Further, an economy’s level of international 
reserves is positively related to its sensitivity to the Joneses effect as measured by β .  
                                                 
10   Abel (1990) studies a model in which an individual’s current consumption depends on 
the lagged aggregated consumption. He suggested the use of the phrase “catching up with the 
Joneses” instead of “keeping up with the Joneses” to reflect the dependence on lagged 
consumption. Nonetheless, we stay with Machlup’s original wording for consistence.   10
Comparing (12) and (16), it can be seen that the positive term ( ) 0
~
* 1 R r β +  is the only 
difference between  b R  and J R . Thus,  J R  is larger than  b R  – the demand for international 
reserves is higher in the presence of the Joneses effect, ceteris paribus. An economy’s optimal 
level of international reserves is higher than the one justified by fundamentals alone when its 
probability of being attacked is adversely affected by international reserves held by other 
economies. Given the possibility of being victimized and suffering output losses from 
speculative attacks with a relatively low level of international reserves, an economy’s  rational 
response is to incorporate others’ behavior into its own decision making process. 
 
2.3  Feedback on Output Outlook  
In this subsection, we modify the model in subsection 2.2 and incorporate the output 
effect of international reserves. It is shown that economies will be encouraged to accumulate 
international reserves if the accumulation can improve their output outlook. 
Recently, Aizenman and Lee (2005) adapt a model by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) to 
show that international reserves enhance output performance by providing the necessary liquidity 
to avert the damaging output effect of capital flight/sudden stop shocks. 
Intuitively, holding of international reserves can affect output via a few channels. For 
instance, international reserves can smooth trade imbalances and, hence consumption. For most 
developing economies, a high level of international reserves helps reduce the premium they have 
to pay for borrowing in the global financial market. Both a smooth consumption stream and a 
low borrowing cost are good for economic growth. Further, the level of international reserves 
can serve as an indicator of financial health and stability of an economy. Thus, a high level of 
international reserves helps developing economies to attract foreign direct investment, which 
tends to boost domestic growth. 
  To illustrate the implication for international reserve demand in the current framework, 
we refine our specification of output shocks in the second period (equation (1)) to  
,0 */ JF RR δδ =+ % ,  
and  
,0 */ JF RR εε =− % .           ( 1 7 )    11
To facilitate comparison, the expression  ,0 / JF RR %  is introduced to the output shocks to capture 
the output effect of international reserves. The subscript “J,F” signifies both the Joneses effect 
and the feedback on output are under consideration. We assume the effects of international 
reserves on output are the same in both the good and bad states to simplify derivation.
11  The 
presence of  0 R %  suggests the output effect depends on the relative rather than the absolute holding 
level of international reserves. For instance, in making a foreign direct investment decision, an 
entrepreneur would consider if the financial health of an economy is better than the alternatives. 
Thus, if the level of international reserves is an indicator, then the relative level will determine 
which economy will get the investment, ceteris paribus. If the positive output effect of 
international reserves outweighs the output loss induced by speculative attack; that is 
,0 */ JF RR ε < % , we have the result described by Aizenman and Lee (2005).  
With the modified output Y2 given by (17), the budget constraint (7) is modified to 
2 C =
2, , , ,
2, , , , ,
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In this case, the credit ceiling  , J F B  explicitly depends on international reserves; 














We solve the utility maximization problem by maximizing  (.) U  in (8) subject to (13), 
(3), (18), and (17). That is, we incorporate the Joneses factor induced by both the speculative 
attack consideration and the output effect of international reserves into the utility maximization 
problem.  
The expression of the optimal demand for international reserves,  , J F R , is given by 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) () ( )
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11   In the Appendix, we employ the Aizenman and Lee (2005) apparatus and show that 
output levels in both good and bad states are increasing functions of the (relative) holding of 
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.        ( 1 9 )  
The optimal  , J F R  can be derived from (19), which is a quadratic equation in  , J F R . Instead of 
solving for a rather complex expression, we just note that the optimal  , J F R  is larger than the  J R  
term given in (16). The result is quite intuitive. For instance,  J R  is increasing in the output 
shocks δ  and -ε , which are larger than their counterparts 
* δ  and -
* ε .
12 In a word, the 
beneficial output effect strengthens the Joneses effect and effectuates a high level of 
international reserves. While most discussions focus on cushioning effects during an attack, the 
hoarding of international reserves can be motivated by their (indirect) contributions to economic 
performance during non-crisis periods. The output effect can be a significant factor for 
developing economies in designing their policies.  
 
3. Empirical  Evidence 
In the previous section, we used a theoretical structure to elaborate Machlup’s (1966) 
contention about international reserve demand behavior. Specifically, we outlined a model to 
interpret the Mrs Machlup’s Wardrobe and keeping up with the Joneses argument and to 
illustrate the dependence of an economy’s international reserve behavior on other economies’ 
holdings of international reserves. Admittedly, the models in Section 2 are quite stylized. They 
are meant to demonstrate the keeping up with the Joneses effect, but not necessarily the exact 
relationship between international reserves held by an economy and by its neighboring 
economies. In the current section, we present some evidence on the relevance of the Mrs 
Machlup’s Wardrobe and keeping up with the Joneses argument. 
  Annual data from 10 Asian economies, namely China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand are used to assess the keeping up with 
the Joneses effect. These economies are located in the 1997 crisis-inflicted region. They are 
either adversely affected by the crisis and/or cited in the recent debate on excessive accumulation 
of international reserves. The sample period is from 1980 to 2004.  
The demand for international reserves is investigated using the regression equations 
                                                 
12   The alternative representations of  b R ,  J R , and  , J F R  given in the Appendix offer another 
way to compare these three variables.   13
it Y  = c + 
'
it X α   +  it ε ,           ( 2 0 )  
it Y  = c + 
'
it X α  + δ ,1 it J −  +  it ε ,   a n d         ( 2 1 )  
it Y  = c + 
'
it X α  + δ ,1 it J −  + ψ I(t-1 > 97)* ,1 it J −  +  it ε ,     (22)   
where i and t are the economy and time indexes,  it Y  is the ratio of international reserves to gross 
domestic product (GDP),  it X is the vector containing the traditional economic variables used in 
the literature to explain the demand for international reserves, and  ,1 it J −  is the variable capturing 
the keeping up with the Joneses effect. Henceforth, we label  ,1 it J −  “the Joneses” variable for 
brevity and define it later. I(.) is the indicator function. The interactive Joneses term I(t-1 > 
97)* ,1 it J −  is included to investigate if there is a change in the Joneses effect in the post-1997 
crisis period. The joint estimation of δ  and ψ  helps determine if there is a change in the 
behavior of demand for international reserves after the 1997 East Asian financial crisis and if the 
Joneses effect only shows up after the crisis. 
  Equation (20) is a canonical specification and includes economic variables commonly 
considered in empirical studies of demand for international reserves.
 13 We normalize 
international reserves with GDP to facilitate comparison across economies of different sizes. The 
variables in the  it X vector are a) the per capita GDP in logarithms, b) the average propensity to 
import given by the imports to GDP ratio, c) the exchange rate volatility measured by the 
standard deviation of monthly exchange rate data, d) the volatility of international reserve 
holding measured by the standard deviation of monthly data on international reserves, and e) the 
financial openness variable given by the sum of absolute values of capital inflow and outflow 
divided by GDP. The Taiwanese data were retrieved from the Central Bank of China (Taiwan) 
website and all other data were retrieved from the World Bank WDI and the IMF databases. 
The Joneses effect is assessed using equations (21) and (22). The key issue is how to 
define the Joneses variable. We do not have a foolproof way to handle it because we do not have 
information on who are the Joneses. As a first attempt, we consider the Joneses variable  it J  
defined by 
                                                 
13   Some recent studies on the empirical international reserve demand behavior include Lane 
and Burke (2001), de Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001), Flood and Marion (2002), 
Aizenman and Marion (2003). Earlier studies are reviewed in, for example, Grubel (1971).    14
  it J  =  ki ≠ Σ kt Y .           ( 2 3 )  
That is, all the other economies in the sample are the Joneses. Later, we consider a few 
alternative definitions of the Joneses variable. 
 
Table 1: Demand for international reserves and the Joneses effect 
 
 
Model (20)  Model (21)  Model (22) 
0.1437*** 0.0605*** 0.0682***  lngdppc 
(9.65) (3.10) (3.63) 
0.4374 0.0015 -0.0164  mp 
(1.08) (0.04) (-0.41) 
0.2105*** 0.1704*** 0.1564***  F_open 
(4.86) (4.20) (4.01) 
0.0000** 0.0000**  0.0000  E_vol 
(2.00) (2.22) (1.49) 
0.0025*** 0.0014**  0.0010  R_vol 
(3.72) (2.14) (1.60) 
 0.0681***  0.0298**  Joneses 
 (6.27)  (2.21) 
   0.0242***  I>97*Joneses 
   (4.45) 
-0.9794*** -0.4236*** -0.4206***  constant 
(-8.73) (-3.03) (-3.14) 
      
Adj.  R-squares  0.5561 0.6211 0.6535 
Observations  235 228 228 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating models (20) to (22) in the text using the panel data technique. 
“lngdppc” is log per capita GDP, “mp” is propensity to import, “F_open” is financial openness, “E_vol” is 
exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is international reserve volatility. “Joneses” is the Joneses variable defined by 
equation (23) in the text. “I>97*Joneses” is the interactive Joneses variable I(t-1>97)*  ,1 it J − . T-statistics are in 
parentheses. “***” and “**” denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
3.1  Panel Data Results 
  The results of estimating (20) to (22) using the panel data technique are presented in 
Table 1. Under specification (20), in the absence of Joneses variables, most of the traditional   15
factors in  it X  are significant. The per capita output is a measure of the level of development and 
is significantly positive – a result similar to the one reported in Lane and Burke (2001). The 
import propensity is the average (rather than marginal) propensity. Thus, it is a proxy for trade 
openness and the degree of vulnerability to external shocks and has the expected positive 
coefficient (Frenkel, 1974).
14  
The effect of financial openness on the holding of international reserves is similar to the 
one of trade openness – a high level of openness increases an economy’s vulnerability to external 
shocks. Even though both openness variables have a positive coefficient estimate, only the 
financial openness estimate is statistically significant. A similar financial openness effect is 
reported in, for example, Flood and Marion (2002).  Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) illustrate the 
effect of international reserve volatility in a stochastic inventory control setting.
15 The estimation 
result is in accordance with the positive impact of international reserve volatility on hoarding of 
international reserves. Similarly, the international reserve holding is found to be negatively 
affected by exchange rate volatility.   
Overall, these five variables explain the international reserve behavior quite well – in 
total they explain 56% of the variation in international reserve holdings of these 10 economies. 
  Estimation results pertaining to specifications (21) and (22) buttress the presence of 
keeping up with the Joneses effect among these East Asian economies between 1980 and 2004. 
Under specification (21), the coefficient estimate of the Joneses variable is highly significant 
with a value of 0.068. In addition to statistical significance, the Joneses effect is of practical 
relevance.  According to the estimate, a dollar increase in the international reserves held by one 
economy will lead to an increase of about .6 dollar by the other nine “peer economies.” The 
inclusion of the Joneses variable lifts the adjusted R-squares from 56% to 62%. Compared with 
the results of (20), the coefficient estimates of the traditional explanatory variables are smaller 
and have a lower level of significance in the presence of the Joneses variable.   
                                                 
14   In contrast to Frenkel, Heller (1966) predicts a negative theoretical relation between 
propensity to import and the level of international reserves based on the argument that the higher 
the propensity to import (m), the smaller marginal costs of balance of payments adjustment (i.e., 
1/m), and the weaker the demand for international reserves. 
15  A similar model, which is the stochastic version of the one developed by Baumol (1952) 
and Tobin (1956), is used by Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980) to model cash holding.   16
The interactive term I(t-1 > 97)* ,1 it J −  in specification (22) is positively significant along 
side with the Joneses variable  ,1 it J − . The Joneses effect is not unique to the post-1997 crisis 
period but it is stronger after the East Asian financial crisis. The inclusion of the interactive 
Joneses term nonetheless lowers the impact of the original Joneses variable. It also weakens the 
significance of the traditional explanatory variables with the exception of the per capita output. 
Indeed, with both the Joneses variable and its interactive term, the per capita output and the 
financial openness are the only two traditional explanatory variables that are significant at the 
5% level. 
The coefficient estimate of the interactive term is quite comparable to that of the Joneses 
variable – suggesting that the keeping up with the Joneses effect is amplified quite noticeably 
after the Asian financial crises. The two estimates indicate that, with a dollar increase in one 
economy’s holding of international reserves, the other peer economies will boost their 
international reserves by slightly less than .3 dollar before the crisis but by slightly larger than .5 
dollar after the crisis. The strengthening of the effect appears in accordance with the anecdotal 
evidence mentioned in the introduction. Apparently, the dramatic adverse effect of the crisis 
sways policymaker’s behavior and makes them be more strategic in positioning their holdings of 
international reserves among their peers. An interesting observation is the presence of the 
keeping up with the Joneses effect even before the crisis. 
One uncertainty is that we do not know, from these economies’ point of view, who are 
their Joneses. Equation (23) implicitly asserts that all the economies in the sample are the 
Joneses. To check the robustness of the estimation results, we consider an alternative 
specification of the Joneses variable. Instead of trying all the possible combinations, we reckon 
the possibility that an economy may identify just a few representatives in the region as the 
Joneses.  Such a strategy may be justified by monitoring costs and by the belief that the 
representative economies have timely information and have good assessment of the regional 
economic conditions. 
Thus, to investigate the robustness of the results, we consider the Joneses variable 
comprises international reserve data from only China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan; that is 
it J  =  China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan k= Σ kt Y .         ( 2 4 )    17
These four are arguably the major economies in the region. For any one of these four economies, 
the Joneses variable is defined to be the sum of the other three economies’ international reserves. 
The estimation results based on the alternative definition of the Joneses variable are presented in 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Demand for international reserves with an alternative definition of the Joneses variable 
 
  Model (21)  Model (22) 
0.1107*** 0.0905***  lngdppc 
(6.72) (5.82) 
0.0474 0.0068  mp 
(1.15) (0.18) 
0.0846** 0.0598*  F_open 
(2.57) (1.95) 
0.0000** 0.0000  E_vol 
(2.13) (1.36) 
0.0016** 0.0009  R_vol 
(2.40) (1.40) 
0.1173*** 0.0372*  Joneses_4 
(6.10) (1.70) 
 0.0946***  I>97*Joneses_4 
 (6.25) 
-0.7671*** -0.5593***  constant 
(-6.27) (-4.75) 
Adj. R-squares  0.5867  0.6498 
Observations  228 228 
 
Note: The table reports the panel regression results of models (21) and (22) in the text. “lngdppc” is log per capita 
GDP, “mp” is propensity to import, “F_open” is financial openness, “E_vol” is exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is 
international reserve volatility. “Joneses_4” is the Joneses variable defined by equation (24) in the text. 
“I>97*Joneses_4” is the interactive Joneses variable I(t-1>97)*  ,1 it J − . t-statistics are in parentheses. “***”, “**”, 
and “*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Compared with Table 1, the Joneses effect based on the four-economy specification is 
stronger. For the whole sample estimation, the Joneses variable coefficient is 0.117 in Table 2   18
versus 0.068 in Table 1. Since only four economies in the sample contribute to the Joneses effect, 
the pattern of response to an increase in international reserves is slightly different from the one 
obtained from Table 1. Specifically, the response will be relatively strong in the first period and 
be relatively moderate in the subsequent periods. To gauge the magnitude of the Joneses effect in 
this setting, we consider the case in which one of the four Joneses economies increases its 
international reserves by one dollar. The increase of total international reserves in the first period 
is slightly over one dollar. In the second period, the total international reserves move up by a 
moderate amount of .4 dollar. 
Apparently, the significance of the four-economy Joneses variable is mainly driven by its 
effect in the post-crisis period. The Joneses variable  ,1 it J −  is significant only at the 10% but not at 
the 5% level in the presence of the significant interaction term I(t-1 > 97)* ,1 it J − .  
In terms of overall explanatory power, the two specifications with a four-economy 
Joneses variable have adjusted R-squares estimate slightly lower than those reported in Table 1. Even 
though the pattern of the Joneses effect changes as we modify the way to construct the Joneses 
variable, the change appears to be a matter of magnitude rather than of the nature of the effect. 
Specifically, both Joneses variables indicate the Joneses effect is stronger in the post-crisis 
period. 
 
3.2 Economy-By-Economy  Results 
The panel regression technique adopted in Tables 1 and 2 improves estimation efficiency 
by pooling data across economies. However, the technique restricts the economies to display 
same responses to explanatory variables. The restriction may not be appropriate for a diverse 
group of economies. An alternative approach is to use the data from individual economies to 
estimate the international reserve demand equations. Such an approach offers only 24 or less 
observations per economy but allows us to explore economy-specific behavior and its possible 
implications for the Joneses effect. Recognizing the small sample size we are working with, we 
report the estimation results for individual economies in Table 3. 
The economy-by-economy results without the Joneses variable are presented in Table 3.a. 
It is evident that the coefficient estimates are heterogeneous across individual economies. There 
are both similarities and differences between these results and those from Model (20) reported in 
Table 1.   19
Table 3.a: Results from individual economies without the Joneses effect 
 
 China  India  Indonesia  Japan  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines Singapore Taiwan  Thailand 
0.1151*** 0.0161  0.0309 0.1344***  0.1184*** 0.1246  -0.0515 0.2902**  -0.4402*** 0.1468***  lngdppc 
(3.69) (0.65) (1.02) (3.00) (5.15) (1.07) (-0.65)  (2.63)  (-3.36) (4.12) 
-0.5428* 0.9984*** 0.5418*  0.9556*** 0.9602***  0.0685  0.4353*** -0.1026 1.7498*** 0.3930***  mp 
(-1.97) (3.42) (1.94)  (3.78) (4.32) (0.43) (6.97)  (-0.99)  (3.74) (3.94) 
-0.1363 -0.1487  -1.3096*** 0.0803  -0.3103 -0.1262  0.1400***  -0.0764 0.3525 0.2376**  F_open 
(-0.41) (-0.53) (-2.90)  (0.62)  (-1.65) (-0.64)  (3.56) (-1.10) (0.83)  (1.97) 
-0.0253 -0.0053  0.0001** -0.0008  -0.0004*** -0.2740*** -0.0093**  -0.5536 -0.0136 -0.0023  E_vol 
(-0.35) (-1.48) (2.78) (-0.74) (-3.92) (-3.18) (-2.51)  (-0.75)  (-0.45) (-0.60) 
0.0046*** 0.0106*** -0.0023  0.0017*** 0.0117*** 0.0431***  -0.0110  0.0338*  0.0165**  -0.0130**  R_vol 
(5.43) (6.22) (-0.13) (4.39) (4.66) (3.73) (-0.63)  (1.81) (2.97) (-1.98) 
-0.5492*** -0.1399  -0.1707 -1.4426*** -1.2295*** -0.8032  0.2928  -1.8721 3.7644***  -1.0589*** constant 
(-3.43) (-1.16) (-0.99) (-3.01) (-5.04) (-0.97)  (0.55) (-1.64) (3.33)  (-4.81) 
Adj R-squares 0.9152 0.9176 0.8244 0.8008 0.9192 0.7958 0.8893  0.8346  0.8432 0.9465 
Observations  23 24 24 25 25 24 25  25  15 25 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating model (20) economy by economy. “lngdppc” is log per capita GDP, “mp” is propensity to 
import, “F_open” is financial openness, “E_vol” is exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is international reserve volatility. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. “***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   20
Table 3.b: Results from individual economies with the Joneses effect 
 
 China  India  Indonesia  Japan  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand 
0.1226*** 0.0448  -0.0378  -0.0150 0.1379*** -0.0112  -0.0647  -0.0112 -0.5494** 0.0994**  lngdppc 
(2.91) (0.69) (-1.02)  (-0.37) (3.07) (-0.07)  (-0.74) (-0.10)  (-2.78) (2.64) 
-0.4901 0.7831* 0.4269*  0.8716*** 0.9513*** 0.1228  0.4054***  -0.2803*** 1.5215** 0.1891  mp 
(-1.44) (1.74) (1.73) (4.97) (4.12) (0.73) (3.52) (-2.95) (2.69) (1.71) 
-0.1901 -0.2066 -0.6230 0.0067 -0.4761**  -0.0081  0.1348***  -0.0581  0.1661  0.4562***  F_open 
(-0.48) (-0.61) (-1.32) (0.08)  (-2.21) (-0.04)  (3.44)  (-1.11)  (0.33)  (3.61) 
-0.0336 -0.0054  0.0001*** 0.0006  -0.0004*** -0.1813*  -0.0075* -0.1226 -0.0095 -0.0037  E_vol 
(-0.42) (-1.45) (3.17)  (0.76)  (-3.6)  (-1.77) (-1.74)  (-0.21) (-0.30) (-1.13) 
0.0046*** 0.0110*** -0.0058  0.0005  0.0114*** 0.0401***  -0.0063  0.0349**  0.0146**  -0.0128**  R_vol 
(5.14) (5.39) (-0.37) (1.44) (4.26) (3.49) (-0.33) (2.49) (2.36) (-2.27) 
-0.0101  -0.0055 0.0410**  0.0619*** -0.0049  0.0647  0.0073  0.1538*** 0.0808 0.0576***  Joneses 
(-0.28)  (-0.32) (2.63) (5.21) (-0.17) (1.63) (0.52)  (3.97) (0.75) (3.15) 
-0.5820** -0.2766  0.1907  0.0035 -1.3804*** 0.1150  0.3743  1.0855  4.7485**  -0.7645*** constant 
(-2.87) (-0.9) (0.94) (0.01) (-3.54) (0.11) (0.64)  (0.97) (2.72) (-3.27) 
Adj R-squares 0.9103 0.9142 0.8678 0.9193 0.9265 0.8094 0.8957  0.902  0.8353 0.9612 
Observations  23 23 24 24 24 23 24  24 15 24 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating model (21) economy by economy. “lngdppc” is log per capita GDP, “mp” is propensity to 
import, “F_open” is financial openness, “E-vol” is exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is international reserve volatility. “Joneses” is the Joneses 
variable defined by equation (23) in the text. t-statistics are in parentheses. “***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively.  21
Table 3.c: Results for individual economies with period-specified Joneses effects 
 
  China India  Indonesia  Japan Korea  Malaysia  Philippines Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand 
0.0902**  -0.0198 0.0389 -0.0176 0.0437 -0.0756  -0.1240*  -0.0050  -0.8913*** 0.1692***  lngdppc 
(2.53) (-0.37) (1.12) (-0.42) (1.35)  (-0.5)  (-1.75) (-0.04) (-3.96)  (6.25) 
-0.2494 0.6319* 0.2958  0.7775*** 0.2596  0.1877  0.3196***  -0.2686** 1.3437**  0.0408  mp 
(-0.87) (1.79) (1.57) (3.56) (1.37) (1.15) (3.40) (-2.71) (2.84)  (0.54) 
-0.0822 0.3899 -0.1483 -0.0044 -0.1095 -0.1070 0.0776**  -0.0566  0.1978 0.2949***  F_open 
(-0.26) (1.24) (-0.39) (-0.05) (-0.74) (-0.53)  (2.21)  (-1.05)  (0.48)  (3.47) 
-0.0369 -0.0023  0.0000** 0.0004  -0.0002**  -0.1575 -0.0062*  -0.1682  0.1055  -0.0085*** E_vol 
(-0.57) (-0.75) (2.32)  (0.53) (-2.49) (-1.61) (-1.81) (-0.28)  (1.81)  (-3.75) 
0.0040*** 0.0098*** -0.0133  0.0005  0.0045**  0.0472***  0.0226  0.0374**  0.0127**  -0.0007  R_vol 
(5.29) (6.05) (-1.10) (1.33) (2.19) (4.06) (1.32) (2.49) (2.46) (-0.18) 
-0.0343 -0.0019 -0.0155  0.0556*** 0.0104  0.0274  -0.0104  0.1292**  0.4535** -0.0063  Joneses 
(-1.12)  (-0.14)  (-0.81) (3.76) (0.60) (0.63) (-0.84) (2.16) (2.37) (-0.37) 
0.0212*** 0.0130*** 0.0278*** 0.0038  0.0387*** 0.0244  0.0222***  0.0128  -0.1242*  0.0290***  I>97*Joneses 
(3.07) (3.39) (3.73) (0.74) (5.46) (1.71) (3.39) (0.55) (-2.2)  (5.23) 
-0.3878**  0.0808 -0.2013 0.0494 -0.4172 0.6339  0.8179  1.0279  7.3576***  -1.1135*** constant 
(-2.21) (0.31) (-1.08) (0.12) (-1.41) (0.59)  (1.71)  (0.90)  (3.95)  (-6.91) 
Adj. R-squares 0.9413 0.9482 0.9249 0.9171 0.9727 0.8299 0.9355 0.8978 0.8886  0.9848 
Observations  23 23 24 24 24 23 24 24 15  24 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating model (22) economy by economy. “lngdppc” is the log per capita GDP, “mp” is the 
import propensity, “F_open” is financial openness, “E_vol” is exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is international reserve volatility. “Joneses” is 
the Joneses variable defined by equation (23) in the text. “I>97*Joneses” is the interactive Joneses variable I(t-1>97)*  ,1 it J − . t-statistics are in 
parentheses. “***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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For instance, the per capita output, propensity to import, and international reserve 
volatility variables are usually positive though not all of them are significant. Compared with the 
panel regression results, the per capita output is less likely to be significant – five out of ten 
estimates are significantly positive.  Taiwan, on the other hand, displays a significantly negative 
output effect on international reserve accumulation. The propensity to import variable is 
significantly positive in seven of the ten cases. China, interestingly, has a negative propensity to 
import effect on international reserve hoarding. The effect of financial openness is weaker than 
that of trade openness. It is also weaker than the financial openness effect reported in Table 1. 
The individual exchange rate volatility effects also appear different from those under the panel 
specification.  
One general observation is that the explanatory power recorded in Table 3.a is higher 
than the one under the panel specification. The adjusted R-squares estimates in Table 3.a are 
80% or higher. The accommodation of economy-specific behavior gives a better fit to the data, 
even though the small sample size (relative to the number of regressors) may have “inflated” the 
goodness of fit measure. 
The effects of the Joneses and the interactive Joneses variables are presented in Tables 
3.b and 3.c. Apparently, the per capita output is affected the most by the presence of the added 
variables. In Table 3.b, seven of the ten Joneses coefficient estimates are positive and four of 
them are statistically significant. The Joneses effect seems quite prevalent in the aftermath of the 
1997 crisis – the interactive Joneses variable has a positive coefficient estimate in nine of the ten 
cases reported in Table 3.c and six of these nine positive estimates are significant. It is also noted 
that the coefficient estimate of the Taiwanese interactive Joneses variable is significantly 
negative. 
In the presence of the interactive variable, the Joneses variable is significantly positive 
for three economies; namely Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan. In the case of Taiwan, the negative 
interactive Joneses effect is weaker than the Joneses effect. There is still the Joneses effect in the 
post crisis period. However, unlike other economies, the Joneses effect experienced by Taiwan in 
the post-crisis period is weaker, instead of stronger. With Taiwan as the only exception, the 
results indicate that the Joneses effect is more prominent after 1997.  23
 
Table 4.a: Results from individual economies with the an alternative definition of the Joneses effect 
 
  China India  Indonesia Japan Korea  Malaysia  Philippines Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand 
0.1206***  0.0458 0.0099  0.0954***  0.1414***  0.0952 -0.0795 0.1547  -0.4842*** 0.1363***  lngdppc 
(3.6)  (0.86) (0.30) (3.20)  (5.85)  (0.68) (-0.92) (1.53) (-3.46)  (3.23) 
-0.4710 0.6770  0.5163*  1.1368***  0.9141***  0.0851  0.4507***  -0.2172**  1.1941 0.3219**  mp 
(-1.51) (1.19) (1.90) (6.55)  (4.38) (0.49) (4.61) (-2.15) (1.59)  (2.64) 
-0.2622  -0.1935 -0.9746* -0.0042  -0.5639** -0.0205 0.1351*** -0.0540  0.1026  0.3339**  F_open 
(-0.63) (-0.36)  (-1.95)  (-0.05) (-2.66) (-0.09) (3.32) (-0.92) (0.21)  (2.26) 
-0.0317 -0.0054  0.0001**  0.0001  -0.0004*** -0.2356**  -0.0085*  -0.3432 -0.0235 -0.0026  E_vol 
(-0.42) (-1.46) (2.78) (0.19)  (-4.37) (-2.37) (-2.00) (-0.54) (-0.74) (-0.66) 
0.0046*** 0.0113*** -0.0048  0.0010*** 0.0125*** 0.0406*** -0.0097  0.0301*  0.0126  -0.0135*  R_vol 
(5.28)  (4.87)  (-0.27) (3.47)  (4.80)  (3.35) (-0.49) (1.92)  (1.81)  (-2.00) 
-0.0278 -0.0122 0.0379  0.0886***  -0.0388 0.0536  0.0014  0.1686*** 0.3376  0.0400  Joneses_4 
(-0.54) (-0.44) (1.41) (5.24)  (-1.15) (0.89)  (0.06)  (3.09)  (0.95)  (1.28) 
-0.5737***  -0.2777  -0.0654  -1.0950*** -1.3863*** -0.6238 0.4765 -0.5079  4.3506***  -0.9898*** constant 
(-3.38) (-1.11)  (-0.36)  (-3.47) (-5.81) (-0.63) (0.82) (-0.49) (3.37)  (-3.76) 
Adj. R-squares 0.9115 0.9146  0.8337 0.9198 0.9317 0.7883 0.8941 0.8791 0.8415 0.9439 
Observations  23 23  24 24 24 23 24 24 15 24 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating model (22) economy by economy. “lngdppc” is log per capita GDP, “mp” is propensity to 
import, “F_open” is financial openness, “E-vol” is exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is international reserve volatility. “Joneses_4” is the 
Joneses variable defined by equation (24) in the text. t-statistics are in parentheses. “***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively.  24
Table 4.b: Results for individual economies with an alternative definition of period-specified Joneses effects 
 
   China  India  Indonesia  Japan  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand 
0.0784** 0.0272  0.0207  0.0462 0.0521** -0.0346  -0.1780** 0.1180  -0.4856** 0.1656***  lngdppc 
(2.54) (0.69) (0.79) (1.70) (2.56) (-0.23)  (-2.74) (1.20)  (-3.21) (6.66) 
-0.3807 0.1423 0.3919*  0.6730*** 0.0991 0.1851  0.3281***  -0.2167** 1.1875  0.0447  mp 
(-1.48) (0.33) (1.79) (3.54) (0.55) (1.08) (4.39) (-2.26)  (1.47) (0.53) 
-0.0385 0.3174 -0.3400 -0.0407 -0.1015 -0.1010  0.0879**  -0.0566 0.1075  0.3684***  F_open 
(-0.11) (1.23) (-0.78) (-0.61) (-0.70) (-0.47)  (2.85)  (-1.02) (0.20)  (4.30) 
-0.0164 -0.0028  0.0000*** -0.0001 -0.0001  -0.1765*  -0.0060*  -0.3209 -0.0220  -0.0080*** E_vol 
(-0.27) (-1.01) (2.49) (-0.20) (-1.60) (-1.80) (-1.95) (-0.53)  (-0.51) (-3.28) 
0.0037***  0.0098*** -0.0148 0.0006** -0.0007  0.0462*** 0.0192  0.0336** 0.0125  -0.0042  R_vol 
(4.71) (5.62) (-1.03) (2.31) (-0.26) (3.95)  (1.23)  (2.24) (1.69) (-1.00) 
-0.0323 -0.0328 -0.0166  0.0606*** -0.0075 0.0180  -0.0447**  0.1089* 0.3678  -0.0089  Joneses_4 
(-0.77) (-1.57) (-0.62) (3.92) (-0.37) (0.30) (-2.23) (1.74) (0.59) (-0.45) 
0.0816*** 0.0480*** 0.0624*** 0.0461*** 0.1978*** 0.0717*  0.0760***  0.0660  -0.0214  0.0771***  I>97*Joneses_4
(2.97) (3.87) (3.35) (3.47) (5.98) (1.85) (4.26) (1.70)  (-0.06) (5.92) 
-0.3433** -0.1332  -0.1090  -0.5321* -0.4210*  0.3471  1.1900**  -0.1402 4.3600**  -1.0978*** constant 
(-2.16) (-0.72) (-0.75) (-1.81) (-1.99) (0.33)  (2.70)  (-0.14) (3.14)  (-7.17) 
Adj R-squares  0.9406 0.9545 0.8961 0.9514 0.9776 0.8161 0.9474 0.8912 0.8189 0.9813 
Observations  23 23 24 24 24 23 24 24 15 24 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating model (22) economy by economy. “lngdppc” is log per capita GDP, “mp” is propensity to 
import, “F_open” is financial openness, “E_vol” is exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is international reserve volatility. “Joneses_4” is the 
Joneses variable defined by equation (24) in the text. “I>97*Joneses_4” is the interactive Joneses variable I(t-1>97)*  ,1 it J − . t-statistics are in 
parentheses. “***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   25
The economy-by-economy results pertaining to the alternative definition of the Joneses 
variable are given in Tables 4.a and 4.b. A comparison of the coefficient estimates of the Joneses 
and the interactive Joneses variables leads to a similar observation – the Joneses effect is more 
prevalent and prominent in the post-1997 crisis sample. Specifically, eight of the ten interactive 
terms are significantly positive and only two Joneses variables are significant. 
Although there are discernable differences in Tables 3.b, 3.c, 4.a, and 4.b, the 
performance of the two alternative specifications of the Joneses variables is quite comparable. 
The differences include the Joneses variable based on the four-economies specification is only 
significant in two cases in Table 4.a while it is significant in four cases in Table 3.b. On the other 
hand, the Joneses effect is stronger in the post crisis period with the four-economies Joneses 
specification. Similar to the panel data results, the regressions with the four-economies Joneses 
variable have adjusted R-squares estimates slightly less than those with the Joneses variable 
defined by all the economies in the sample. Nonetheless, these two sets of results are suggestive 
of the presence of the keeping up with the Joneses effect.  
These regressions results, especially those allowing for economy–specific behavior, the 
selected variables (both the traditional macroeconomic variables and the two Joneses variables)  
explain the evolution of the holdings of international reserves quite well. To offer some insights 
on the debate of excessive international reserve hoarding, we examine the estimated residual that 
is given by the difference between the actual level of international reserve holdings and the level 
explained by the regressors. Thus, a positive estimated residual suggests that the actual holding 
level is higher than the one warranted by the model. 
According to the argument, the Joneses effect will lead to a level of international reserves 
that is higher than the one implied by fundamentals alone. If the Joneses effect is in operation but 
it is not accounted for in the regression analysis, the observed international reserves will appear 
higher than they should be. Thus, with the Joneses effect, the predicted value of international 
reserve holding should be higher in the presence of Joneses variables than without them. 
Figure 1 presents graphs of estimated residuals from the model with only traditional 
macroeconomic variables as regressors and from the model that also includes both the Joneses 
and the interactive Joneses variables. Since the inclusion of the Joneses variables tend to improve 
the goodness of the fit, it is not surprising to observe that estimated residuals from the model 
allowing for the Joneses effect are in general smaller than those from the model without the   26
Joneses variable. Another way to interpret the result is that the incorporation of the Joneses effect 
makes the observed international reserve holdings closer to the predicted values. During the 2000 
to 2004 period, the presence of the Joneses variables will in general reduce the estimated level of 
“excessive” holding. Indeed, the Joneses effect reverses the inference from “excessive” holding 
to “deficient” holding in the case of India, Philippines, and Thailand. 
In sum the results from both the panel and economy-by-economy regressions are, in 
general, supportive of the notion that an economy’s international reserve demand behavior is 
affected by other economies’ action.
 16  
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16   As a robust check, we added the lagged dependent variable as one of the regressors. The 
results, provided in the Appendix, on the Joneses results are qualitatively the same as those 
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Notes: The line graph labeled “err” gives the estimated residuals from fitting individual economy data to the 
equation (20) in the text. Equation (20) includes only traditional macroeconomic variables as regressors. The line 
graph labeled “j_err” gives the estimated residuals from fitting individual economy data to the equation (22), which 
includes both the Joneses and the interactive Joneses variables. 
 
 
3.3 Additional  Analyses 
  A few additional analyses are conducted to evaluate the robustness of the empirical 
Joneses effect. First, we consider the Joneses variable defined by the five economies directly 
inflicted by the East Asian crisis; that is 
it J  =  Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and Korea k= Σ kt Y .        ( 2 5 )  
It may be argued that China, Japan and Taiwan are quite different from other economies in the 
sample. Economies in the region, instead, may use the five crisis-inflicted economies to 
formulate their international reserve hoarding strategies. To accommodate this possibility, we 
present the panel estimation results based on the Joneses variable defined by (25) in Table 5.  
Again, for any one of these five economies, the Joneses variable is defined to be the sum of the 
international reserves held by the other four economies.  
  One noticeable difference between results in Table 5 and those in Tables 1 and 2 is that 
the Joneses effect defined by the crisis-5 economies is only statistically significant in the post-  32
1997 period while the other two specifications of the Joneses variable are significant in both the 
pre- and post-1997 periods. That is, the evidence suggests that the recent East Asian financial 
crisis has put the international reserves of these five economies in spotlight. One possible 
interpretation is that other economies do not want to repeat the experiences of these crisis-
inflicted economies and, thus, pay attention to their levels of international reserves. 
 
Table 5: Demand for international reserves with the Joneses variable defined by crisis-5 
economies 
 
  Model (21)  Model (22) 
0.0648*** 0.0870***  lngdppc 
(3.26) (4.40) 
0.0185 0.0228  mp 
(0.44) (0.57) 
0.1377** 0.1427***  F_open 
(3.27) (3.53) 
0.0000** 0.0000  E_vol 
(2.11) (1.48) 
0.0014** 0.0012*  R_vol 
(2.19) (1.83) 
0.1288*** 0.0152  Joneses_5 
(5.79) (0.45) 
 0.0719***  I>97*Joneses_5 
 (4.34) 
-0.4139*** -0.5413***  constant 
(-2.82) (-3.76) 
Adj. R-squares  0.6121  0.6439 
Observations  228 228 
Note: The table reports the panel regression results of models (21) and (22) in the text. “lngdppc” is log per capita 
GDP, “mp” is propensity to import, “F_open” is financial openness, “E_vol” is exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is 
international reserve volatility. “Joneses_5” is the Joneses variable defined by the crisis-5 economies; namely 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand as stated in equation (25) in the text. “I>97*Joneses_5” is the 
interactive Joneses variable I(t-1>97)*  ,1 it J − . t-statistics are in parentheses. “***”, “**”, and “*” denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
A few additional observations on the crisis-5 Joneses variable results are in order. First, it 
is noted that the use of the crisis-5 Joneses variable does not have a large impact on coefficient   33
estimates of the standard economic factors in, say, Table 1. Second, the adjusted R-squares in 
Table 5 are comparable to the corresponding ones in Tables 1 and 2; indicating that models with 
the crisis-5 Joneses variable offer explanatory power similar to models with the other 
specifications of the Joneses variable. Third, the economy-by-economy regression results also 
suggest that the Joneses effect attributed to the crisis-5 economies mainly show up in the post-
1997 period.
17 Specifically, under model (22) the interactive Joneses variable capturing the post-
1997 effect is statistically significant in eight of the ten cases and none of the Joneses variable is 
significant. 
The empirical Joneses effect appears robust to the few ways we defined “the Joneses.” 
One possible concern about the empirical Joneses variable is that it measures some common 
latent dynamics that drive the economies in the sample and, hence, their hoarding of international 
reserves. If it is the case, then the reported Joneses effect is spurious. To guide against this 
possibility, we re-examine the Joneses effect in the presence of a common output growth 
variable. It is perceived that output growth is a reasonable proxy for general economic conditions 
and, thus, a common output growth variable is a reasonable proxy for common latent factors that 
affect international reserve hoarding behavior. 
Table 6 presents the Joneses effect in the presence of a common output growth variable, 
which is given by the principal component of GDP growth rates of the economies in the sample. 
It is quite encouraging to observe that the Joneses effect revealed in Table 6 is quite comparable 
to the one reported in, say, Table 1. The common output growth variable has a significantly 
negative coefficient under model (21) and an insignificant one under (22). The coefficient 
estimates of other variables are similar to those in Table 1. According to the adjusted R-squares 
estimates, the inclusion of the common output growth variable marginally improves the models’ 
goodness of fit. Even within the economy-by-economy regression framework, the significance of 
the Joneses variable is not materially affected by the inclusion of the common output growth 
variable.
18 
                                                 
17   These economy-by-economy results are reported in the Appendix. 
18   Again, the results of estimating the economy-by-economy regression incorporating the 
common output growth variables are reported in the Appendix for brevity.    34
Table 6: Demand for international reserves with both the Joneses variable and the common 
growth element  
  Model (21)  Model (22) 
0.0461** 0.0691***  lngdppc 
(2.27) (3.35) 
-0.0049 -0.0163  mp 
(-0.12) (-0.40) 
0.1619*** 0.1567***  F_open 
(4.01) (4.00) 
0.0000 0.0000  E_vol 
(1.53) (1.47) 
0.0013** 0.0010  R_vol 
(2.10) (1.59) 
0.0774*** 0.0287*  Joneses 
(6.73) (1.68) 
 0.0246***  I>97*Joneses 
 (3.76) 
-0.0764** 0.0041  PC_gdp_growth 
(-2.28) (0.11) 
-0.3229** -0.4261***  constant 
(-2.22) (-2.96) 
Adj. R-squares  0.6302  0.6536 
Observations  228 228 
Note: The table reports the panel regression results of models (21) and (22) in the text. “lngdppc” is log per capita 
GDP, “mp” is propensity to import, “F_open” is financial openness, “E_Vol” is exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is 
international reserve volatility. “Joneses” is the Joneses variable defined by equation (23) in the text. 
“I>97*Joneses” is the interactive Joneses variable I(t-1>97)*  ,1 it J − . “PC_gdp_growth” is the principal component 
of the sample economies’ GDP growth rates. t-statistics are in parentheses. “***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Apparently, the information contents of the Joneses variable and the common output 
growth variable about international reserves do not overlap that much. The empirical Joneses 
effect is not induced by common latent dynamics represented by common output growth. 
The estimation results based on an alternative specification of the possible latent factor 
are presented in Tables 7a and 7b. Since the common aggregate output indicator does not alter 
the empirical Joneses result, we use the lagged international reserve variable as a proxy for the  35
 
Table 7.a: Results from individual economy with both the Joneses variable and the lagged dependent variable 
 
 China  India  Indonesia  Japan  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand 
L_rg_ratio  0.4891*  0.7109*** 0.4173*** 1.0884*** 0.6869*** 0.0385  0.3159  0.3827  0.8139**  0.4474** 
  (2.02) (4.30) (3.94) (11.07)  (4.16) (0.16) (1.51)  (1.61)  (3.26) (2.58) 
lngdppc  0.0711 0.0564 -0.0183  -0.0057  0.0454 -0.0082  -0.1034 -0.0833 -0.1542  0.0322 
  (1.54) (1.26) (-0.66)  (-0.40)  (1.16) (-0.05)  (-1.18) (-0.72) (-0.86)  (0.77) 
mp  -0.1987  -0.0727  0.1852 0.0031 0.0933 0.1107 0.3206**  -0.2684***  0.1296 0.0785 
  (-0.58)  (-0.20)  (0.97) (0.03) (0.35) (0.59) (2.58)  (-2.95) (0.23) (0.75) 
F_open  -0.2204 -0.1320 -0.0145 -0.0339 -0.0858 -0.0099 0.0995**  -0.0725  0.0408  0.4407*** 
  (-0.61) (-0.57) (-0.04) (-1.14) (-0.48) (-0.05) (2.24)  (-1.42)  (0.12)  (4.02) 
E_Vol  -0.0404 -0.0022 0.0001***  -0.0000 -0.0002**  -0.1774 -0.0069  0.1350  0.0247  -0.0042 
  (-0.55) (-0.83) (3.50)  (-0.11) (-2.13) (-1.64) (-1.64)  (0.23)  (1.05)  (-1.46) 
R_Vol  0.0029**  0.0069*** 0.0023  0.0005*** 0.0112*** 0.0396*** 0.0017  0.0346**  0.0105**  -0.0094* 
  (2.46) (4.10) (0.20) (4.24) (5.84) (3.22) (0.09)  (2.58)  (2.40) (-1.87) 
Joneses  -0.0126 -0.0093 0.0180  0.0018  -0.0280 0.0620  0.0013  0.1072**  0.0707  0.0452** 
  (-0.38)  (-0.78)  (1.40) (0.26) (-1.34)  (1.39) (0.09)  (2.28)  (0.98) (2.74) 
constant  -0.3342 -0.2916 0.0882  0.0548  -0.3604 0.0948  0.6526  1.5321  1.2821  -0.2814 
  (-1.50) (-1.37) (0.58)  (0.38)  (-0.97) (0.08) (1.10)  (1.39)  (0.81) (-1.02) 
Adj  R-Squares  0.9248 0.9590 0.9288 0.9901 0.9625 0.7970 0.9031  0.9104  0.9254 0.9709 
Observations  23 23 24 24 24 23 24  24  15 24 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating model (21) economy by economy. “l_rg_ratio” is the lagged dependent variable, “lngdppc” is 
log per capita GDP, “mp” is propensity to import, “F_open” is financial openness, “E-Vol” is exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is international 
reserve volatility. “Joneses” is the Joneses variable defined by equation (23) in the text. t-statistics are in parentheses. “***”, “**”, and “*” 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   36
Table 7.b:  Results from individual economy with the period-specific Joneses variables and the lagged dependent variable 
 
 China  India  Indonesia  Japan  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand 
l_rg_ratio 0.0552  0.5242***  0.2660*  1.0889***  0.3783**  0.1224  0.2744 0.6317**  1.0430  0.0640 
  (0.18) (2.95) (2.02) (10.51)  (2.62) (0.52) (1.70)  (2.41) (1.80)  (0.39) 
lngdppc  0.0863* 0.0171  0.0184 -0.0057 0.0183  -0.0703 -0.1555**  -0.1092 0.0888  0.1553*** 
  (2.01) (0.38) (0.55) (-0.38)  (0.62) (-0.45)  (-2.24) (-1.00)  (0.15)  (3.43) 
mp  -0.2307 0.0672  0.1979 0.0038  -0.0253 0.1536  0.2490** -0.2211**  -0.1938  0.0340 
  (-0.73)  (0.19) (1.10)  (0.04) (-0.13)  (0.86) (2.54)  (-2.48)  (-0.20)  (0.43) 
K_open  -0.0920 0.1836  0.0360 -0.0338 0.0061  -0.1194 0.0490  -0.0767 -0.0067  0.3025*** 
  (-0.27) (0.69)  (0.10) (-1.09) (0.05)  (-0.57) (1.32)  (-1.60) (-0.02)  (3.38) 
E_Vol  -0.0374 -0.0013 0.0000**  -0.0000 -0.0001*  -0.1434 -0.0057* 0.1480  -0.0100  -0.0083*** 
  (-0.56) (-0.52) (2.76) (-0.10) (-1.98) (-1.38) (-1.74)  (0.27)  (-0.12)  (-3.44) 
R_Vol  0.0038*** 0.0073*** -0.0049  0.0005*** 0.0062*** 0.0460*** 0.0286  0.0427*** 0.0100* -0.0010 
  (3.26) (4.71) (-0.41)  (4.08) (3.32) (3.80) (1.72)  (3.20) (2.12)  (-0.23) 
Joneses  -0.0331 -0.0062 -0.0059 0.0019  -0.0065 0.0162  -0.0150  -0.0066 -0.0758  -0.0041 
  (-1.03) (-0.57) (-0.32) (0.25)  (-0.40) (0.33)  (-1.25)  (-0.09) (-0.22)  (-0.23) 
I>97*Joneses  0.0200* 0.0073* 0.0159* -0.0000 0.0282***  0.0259* 0.0214***  0.0434* 0.0478  0.0273*** 
  (1.99) (1.99) (1.76) (-0.02)  (3.88) (1.74) (3.45)  (1.80) (0.45)  (3.73) 
constant  -0.3712*  -0.0868 -0.0985 0.0543  -0.1167 0.6035  1.0440** 1.6277  -0.6989  -1.0232*** 
  (-1.82)  (-0.39)  (-0.56)  (0.36) (-0.42)  (0.55) (2.21)  (1.57) (-0.15)  (-3.58) 
Adj  R-Squares  0.9372 0.9658 0.9371 0.9894 0.9801 0.8212 0.9423  0.9215 0.9157  0.9839 
Observations  23 23 24  24 24 23 24  24 15  24 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating model (22) economy by economy. “l_rg_ratio” is the lagged dependent variable, “lngdppc” is 
the log per capita GDP, “mp” is the import propensity, “F_open” is financial openness, “E_Vol” is exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is 
international reserve volatility. “Joneses” is the Joneses variable defined by equation (23) in the text. “I>97*Joneses” is the interactive Joneses 
variable I(t-1>97)*  ,1 it J − . t-statistics are in parentheses. “***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  37
possible latent factor. In contrast to common output growth, individual lagged international 
reserve variables are used in their respective economy-by-economy regression equations to 
capture the possibility of economy-specific latent factors. 
The presence of lagged international reserves does not substantially alter the inference of 
the Joneses effect. Comparing with results in, say, Table 3b, there is a lower frequency of the 
Joneses effect in Table 7a. On other hand, the post-1997 Joneses effect in Table 7b is slightly 
more widespread than the one found in Table 3c – there are eight significant Joneses variables in 
the former and seven in the latter. Indeed, the significantly negative Taiwanese Joneses effect in 
Table 3c becomes a positive, though not significant, effect in Table 7b. On the average, the 
evidence does not weaken the empirical Joneses effect. 
 
4. Concluding  Remarks 
In this exercise, we explore a motive for hoarding international reserves that was 
advocated by Fritz Machlup in the 1960s. Specifically, we consider the Mrs Machlup’s wardrobe 
hypothesis and the related keeping up with the Joneses argument. Motivated by events that 
happened in the post-1997 crisis period, we speculate that, in addition to psychological reasons, 
there may be economic reasons underlying the keeping up with the Joneses behavior. For 
instance, if an economy is holding a level of international reserves that is relatively lower than 
the Joneses, it is more vulnerable to speculative attacks. Further, for developing economies, 
international reserves can have a positive impact on their growth prospects, which, in turn can 
reduce their vulnerability to crises. We use a stylized model to illustrate these effects on the 
hoarding of international reserves. 
A canonical empirical international reserve demand equation is used to investigate the 
presence of the Joneses effect in a group of East Asian economies. Both linear and panel-based 
regression results are suggestive of the presence of the Joneses effect; especially in the post-1997 
crisis period. Individual economy estimation results, however, show that the Joneses effect is not 
uniform across economies.  
There are a few caveats. First, the stylized model is used to highlight the Joneses effect. It 
does not, however, imply that other motivations for holding international reserves are not 
important. For instance, the increasing capital mobility and growing financial account 
liberalization around the world will boost the demand for international reserves to smooth out   38
payment imbalances. However, our exercise demonstrates that one seemingly non-economic 
reason, the so-called Mrs Machlup’s wardrobe hypothesis, may help account for the part of 
international reserve accumulation that is not explained by standard macroeconomic variables. 
We realize that the Joneses effect varies across economies and does not necessarily affect all the 
economies around the world. However, there is a reason to believe that the Joneses effect is in 
play for some Asian economies. 
Second, our empirical evidence is meant to be illustrative rather than definitive. For one 
thing, we do not have a priori information on “the Joneses” of a given economy. Our choice of 
economies is based on convenience and the recent discussions in the media. Further, there is a 
possibility that our Joneses variable is correlated with some latent variables that drive demand 
for international reserves. To contemplate these issues, we consider three different definitions of 
the Joneses variable and two alternative approaches to capture latent variables. The empirical 
evidence, in general, is indicative of the presence of the Joneses effect. Arguably, the study of 
Joneses effects will be benefited from a more elaborate framework of demand for international 
reserves. 
  In the text, it is asserted that, in addition to psychological reasons, the keeping up with 
the Joneses effect can have some economic content. Specifically, the probability of speculative 
attack and the effect on output are deemed relevant factors for the peer group effect. While the 
two arguments appear reasonable, we provide no empirical evidence to substantiate the claim. 
The paucity of data is the main excuse. For instance, sovereign spreads (or ratings) may be used 
as a proxy for the probability of having a speculative attack. Nonetheless, we do not have these 
data for the sample under considerations.
19 On the output effect, the results are mostly theoretical 
ones based on the perception that international reserves mitigate the output loss/adjustment cost 
during the crisis time and prevent financial crises, hence, improve the output outlook.
20  
At the risk of repeating, we have to point out again that the empirical Joneses effect may 
be due to any mechanisms that give rise to competitive hoarding behavior including the implicit 
psychological motivation mentioned in Machlup (1966). Instead of viewing the empirical results 
                                                 
19   Recently, Garcia and Soto (2004) find that the ratio of international reserves to short-term 
debts explains the occurrence of crises. Noted that their proxy for crisis is given by a weighted 
average of the first differences in real exchange rate and the level of international reserves. 
20   See, for example, Aizenman, et al. (forthcoming), Aizenman and Lee (2005), and Ben-
Bassat and Gottieb (1992). 
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as definite evidence of the Joneses effect, we can say that, for some economies, there is evidence 
of inter-dependence of their holdings of international reserves and the evidence is robust to the 
presence of standard macro determinants, a few controls, and a few alternative specifications of 
the “Joneses” variable. Unfortunately, without a formal model to separate the potential causes of 
competitive behavior, it is hard to empirically disentangle them. Further analyses of these 
arguments, which are beyond the scope of the current study, will shed additional insights into the 
Joneses effect.  40
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A. The  risk  premium 
Because of the default risk, the home economy has to pay a risk premium to borrow in 
the global capital market. This leads the foreign debt interest rate that home country has to pay to 
be higher than the world interest rate. To illustrate the point, suppose the home economy defaults 
only in the bad state of nature. The expected debt service is  
[] () ( ) [] ε θ − ⋅ ⋅ + + − ⋅ + + − = 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( q B r q p B r p S E      (A1) 
With (5) in the text,  
( ) ( ) [ ] ε θ − ⋅ ⋅ + + − ⋅ + + − = + 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( *) 1 ( q B r q p B r p B r    (A2)   
Re-arranging, we obtain  
() ) 1 ( *) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ε θ − − + = − + pq B r B pq r       ( A 3 )    
Since the default occurs when  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ε θ − > + B r , (A3) can be rewritten as  
() B r pq B r B pq r ) 1 ( *) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 + − + > − + , 
which can be simplified to B r B r *) 1 ( ) 1 ( + > + , and, thus, for a positive borrowing B 
* r r > .          (A4)   43
B.  The Output effect of International Reserves 
The Aizenman and Lee (2005) model, which is based on the work of Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983), is used to illustrate the output effect of international reserves. In this setting, 
international reserves help cushion the output effect of liquidity shocks. Consider an economy 
that finances a long term project via bank loans. The representative agent is both the entrepreneur 
and the banker who does the financing and investment.  
In period 1, the risk neutral central planner borrows B in the global capital market and 
makes deposit in the bank. The deposit B has two components – one component is international 
reserve holding, R that does not go into the production process and the other component (B-R) is 
used to finance the long term investment. The long term investment is undertaken prior to the 
realization of a liquidity shock. Note that it is the central planner who decides on the allocation 
of B between international reserves R and productive capital (B-R). The reprehensive agent only 
does the financing and investment. 
At the beginning of period 2, a stochastic liquidity (sudden stop) shock is realized with 
the aggregate value of Z. The shock, say, is affected by a speculative attack. If the realization Z is 
less than the holding of international reserves, R, the economy uses the international reserve 
holding R to fill in the sudden drop in liquidity and produces with capital (B-R). Thus, the 
economy does not suffer from output losses.  
On the other hand, if Z is greater than R, then it triggers a premature liquidation of 
amount (Z-R). The liquidation is accompanied by an adjustment cost that is proportional to (Z-R), 
say λ(Z-R), 0<λ<1. Therefore, when the level of international reserves is not large enough to 
cover the amount of sudden drop in liquidity, the economy suffers an output loss. The net capital 
for the production in period 2 is,  
() ( )( )
2
1
                          
if Z R BR ZR
K
if Z R BR
λ > ⎧−− + −
= ⎨ ≤ − ⎩
.     (B1)   
The production technology of the long-term project in period 2 is given by  
  () ( ) ()
[]
2
1           
             1                              
ABR ZR with probability p
Y
with probability p AB R
λ ⎧ ⎡⎤ −− + − ⎪ ⎣⎦ = ⎨ − − ⎪ ⎩
,   (B2)   44
where A is the productivity parameter.
 21   r A + >1 , allows the economy at least to pay off the 
debt that carries an interest rate r. The probability of having a speculative attack that leads to 
output losses is p and, in this case,  () p prob Z R => .  
We express the liquidity shock in term of B using  zB Z =  and assume  z follows a 
uniform distribution in [0, 1]. The expected output in period 2 is  
() ( )( ) ( ) [] ( ) [ ] R B A p R Z R B pA Y E − − + − + − − = 1 1 2 λ .     (B3) 
Following the argument in Section 2.1, the deposit ceiling B is given by 
() () () ( ) [] ( ) [ ] R B A p R Z R B pA B r − − ⋅ + − + − − ⋅ = + 1 1 * 1 θ λ θ    (B4) 
and  ( ) 2 E Y  is  
()( ) 2 1*/ E Yr B θ =+ .        ( B 5 )    





r r ⋅ − = − κ ψ ,          ( B 6 )  
where ψ  and κ  are the appropriate parameters, and  0
~
R  is the average of international reserves 
held by the Joneses. In essence, we assume the additional amount of interest the economy has to 
pay in the international capital market is negatively (positively) related to its own (peers’) level 
of international reserves. Suppose there are two economies seeking loans in the international 
capital market. If the two economies are identical with exception that they hold different levels 
of international reserves. If lenders use international reserves as a measure of an economy’s 
financial well being, then they are willing to offer the loan at a lower rate to the economy with a 
relatively higher level of international reserves. The parameter ψ  captures all the other factors 
determining the interest rate differential.  
At the credit ceiling, it can be shown that the contractual repayment equals the default 
penalty in the best state of nature; that is ( ) R B A r B − ⋅ = + θ ) 1 ( . Substituting in (B6), we have 
0 () / ( 1 * / ) B Rr R R θλ ψ κ =⋅ ⋅ ++ − ⋅ % .        ( B 7 )  
From (B5) and (B7), we have 
() ( ) 20 1*/ ( 1* /) E Yr R r R R λψ κ =⋅+ + +−⋅ % .      (B8) 
                                                 
21   (B2) is a A-K model Cobb-Douglas function 
α AK Y =  with  1 α = .    45
Thus, (B8) shows that the expected output is positively associated with the economy’s own level 
of international reserves and is negatively associated with its peer group’s level. Further it can be 
shown that the effects of R and  0 R %  on output levels when Z > R or Z ≤ R are the same as their 
effect on the expected output. That is, own (peers’) international reserves have a positive 
(negative) impact on output in both the crisis and non-crisis periods. As stated in the text, the 
specification (17) for output shocks is used to facilitate comparison with models in Sections 2.1 
and 2.2.   46
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where  J ω is ω  with P replaced by PJ . These representations are simpler than those given in the 
text but they contain endogenous variables and, thus, strictly speaking, are not the solutions to 
the model. Note that  J ω > ω  and  00 /{ [(1/ *) ( /1 *)]} RR r r ρθ −− + + %%  > 1, ceteris paribus. Thus, 
b R <  J R  <  , J F R . 47
D. Additional  Tables 
 
Table D1.a: Results from individual economies with the Joneses effect and the lagged dependent variable 
 
   China India  Indonesia  Japan Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand 
0.4985* 0.7846*** 0.4663*** 1.2046*** 0.6083*** 0.1440  0.3227  0.4969* 0.8043*** 0.7161***  l_rg_ratio 
(2.08) (5.07) (4.97)  (11.45)  (3.74) (0.60) (1.60) (2.09) (3.31) (4.23) 
0.0676 0.0839**  -0.0053 -0.0108 0.0288 0.0869 -0.1090 -0.0026 -0.1000 0.0045  lngdppc 
(1.70) (2.45) (-0.25)  (-0.79) (0.82) (0.60) (-1.29) (-0.02) (-0.67) (0.11) 
-0.1689 -0.5909 0.1815 -0.1153 0.0995  0.0480 0.3326** -0.2256** -0.1201  0.0308  mp 
(-0.53) (-1.36) (0.96) (-0.93) (0.37) (0.25) (2.80) (-2.44)  (-0.19) (0.28) 
-0.3115 -0.1535 0.0397 -0.0327 -0.1319 -0.0216  0.0979** -0.0746  -0.0040 0.4491***  F_open 
(-0.83) (-0.80) (0.10) (-1.13) (-0.67) (-0.09) (2.16) (-1.37) (-0.01) (4.15) 
-0.0381 -0.0021  0.0001*** -0.0001  -0.0002* -0.2103 -0.0072  0.0739  0.0123  -0.0041  E_vol 
(-0.56) (-0.85) (3.41) (-0.43) (-2.03) (-1.91) (-1.73) (0.12)  (0.51) (-1.44) 
0.0029** 0.0079*** 0.0028 0.0005*** 0.0112*** 0.0385*** 0.0005  0.0316** 0.0089* -0.0084  R_vol 
(2.50) (4.96) (0.24) (4.83) (5.58) (3.00) (0.03) (2.21) (1.86) (-1.68) 
-0.0348 -0.0364* 0.0270 -0.0114 -0.0283 0.0478  -0.002  0.0999  0.2832 0.0662**  Joneses_4 
(-0.74) (-2.02) (1.55) (-1.09) (-1.11) (0.77) (-0.09) (1.67) (1.19) (2.88) 
-0.3192 -0.4067**  0.0162 0.1230 -0.2444 -0.5642 0.6913 0.6830 0.9518 -0.0631  constant 
(-1.62) (-2.57) (0.14) (0.81) (-0.69) (-0.56) (1.22) (0.61) (0.71) (-0.22) 
Adj R-Squared  0.9267 0.9665 0.9305 0.9907 0.9613 0.7795 0.9031  0.899  0.9295 0.9718 
Observations  23 23 24 24 24 23 24 24 15 24 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating model (22) economy by economy. “l_rg_ratio” is the lagged dependent variable, “lngdppc” is 
the log per capita GDP, “mp” is the import propensity, “F_open” is financial openness, “E_Vol” is exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is 
international reserve volatility. “Joneses_4” is the Joneses variable defined by equation (24) in the text. t-statistics are in parentheses. “***”, 
“**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  48
Table D1.b: Results from individual economies with period-specified Joneses effects and the lagged dependent variable 
 
   China India  Indonesia  Japan Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand 
0.1121 0.5796*** 0.3748*** 1.2629*** 0.1587  0.1549  0.1712  0.5643** 0.8909*** 0.2653  L_rg_ratio 
(0.37) (3.82) (3.07) (8.06) (0.89) (0.70) (1.12) (2.66) (3.49) (1.37) 
0.0716*  0.0632* 0.0016 -0.0112 0.0364 -0.0449  -0.1867** -0.0673  -0.0432 0.1099**  lngdppc 
(1.94)  (2.11)  (0.07) (-0.80) (1.35) (-0.30) (-2.88) (-0.62) (-0.27) (2.32) 
-0.3236 -0.5682 0.2016 -0.1313 0.0118 0.1462 0.2740  -0.2260** -0.1875  0.0017  mp 
(-1.05) (-1.55) (1.08) (-1.00) (0.06) (0.80) (3.10) (-2.77) (-0.29) (0.02) 
-0.0763 0.1309 0.0733 -0.0306 -0.0598 -0.1030  0.0714** -0.0804  -0.0697 0.4030***  F_open 
(-0.21) (0.68) (0.19) (-1.03) (-0.39) (-0.47) (2.11) (-1.67) (-0.21) (4.63) 
-0.0197 -0.0014  0.0000*** -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.1486  -0.0054* 0.1568 -0.0013  -0.0073***  E_vol 
(-0.31)  (-0.70)    (3.12)  (-0.37)  (-1.39) (-1.38) (-1.77) (0.29) (-0.05) (-2.98) 
0.0034*** 0.0079*** -0.0024 0.0005*** 0.0010 0.0440*** 0.0225 0.0360** 0.0089  -0.0045  R_vol 
(3.08) (5.87) (-0.19) (4.68) (0.30) (3.58) (1.44) (2.81) (1.88) (-1.09) 
-0.0333 -0.0420** 0.0092  -0.0135  -0.0095  0.0113 -0.0433** 0.0201  -0.0625  0.0123  Joneses_4 
(-0.77) (-2.74) (0.39) (-1.18) (-0.47) (0.19) (-2.17) (0.32) (-0.15) (0.50) 
0.0718* 0.0277** 0.0229  -0.0044  0.1674*** 0.0724* 0.0707*** 0.0780** 0.2408 0.0590***  I>97*Joneses_
4  (1.85) (2.66) (1.15) (-0.51) (3.50) (1.84) (3.87) (2.34) (1.04) (3.23) 
-0.3137 -0.2896* -0.0158  0.1279  -0.2714  0.4213 1.2542** 1.2787  0.4801 -0.7292**  constant 
(-1.72) (-2.06) (-0.13) (0.83) (-1.00) (0.39) (2.85) (1.26) (0.34) (-2.37) 
Adj R-Squared  0.9369 0.9761 0.9319 0.9903 0.9773 0.8097 0.9482 0.9211 0.9303 0.9823 
Observations  23 23 24 24 24 23 24 24 15 24 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating model (22) economy by economy. “l_rg_ratio” is the lagged dependent variable, “lngdppc” is 
the log per capita GDP, “mp” is the import propensity, “F_open” is financial openness, “E_Vol” is exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is 
international reserve volatility. “Joneses_4” is the Joneses variable defined by equation (24) in the text. “I>97*Joneses_4” is the interactive 
Joneses variable I(t-1>97)*  ,1 it J − . t-statistics are in parentheses. “***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.  49
Table D2.a: Results from individual economies with the Joneses effect defined by the crisis_5 economies  
 
 China  India  Indonesia  Japan  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand 
0.0959** 0.0385  -0.0474 0.0820  0.0709  0.0150  -0.0644  0.0228  -0.4615**  0.1383***  lngdppc 
(2.33) (0.18) (-1.51)  (1.20) (1.72)  (0.09) (-0.79) (0.15) (-2.43) (4.51) 
-0.5857* 0.8278*  0.2250 0.8574** 0.7092*** 0.0955 0.3557***  -0.2470** 1.7393*** 0.1394  mp 
(-2.05) (2.27) (0.98) (2.70) (2.97)  (0.56) (3.03)  (-2.10) (3.48)  (1.22) 
-0.0748 -0.0397 -0.3345 0.0829  -0.4380**  -0.1367  0.1119**  -0.0686 0.3134  0.3117***  F_open 
(-0.21) (-0.11) (-0.77) (0.64) (-2.36) (-0.67)  (2.51)  (-1.07) (0.62)  (3.00) 
-0.0106 -0.0047  0.0001*** -0.0004  -0.0003*** -0.1889* -0.0067 -0.3011 -0.0124 -0.0031  E_vol 
(-0.14) (-1.22) (4.07)  (-0.38)  (-3.31) (-1.86) (-1.63) (-0.43)  (-0.38) (-0.96) 
0.0047*** 0.0104*** -0.0080  0.0013** 0.0115*** 0.0442***  -0.0029  0.0430**  0.0162**  -0.0115*  R_vol 
(5.39) (5.75) (-0.57)  (2.71) (5.08)  (3.70) (-0.15) (2.45) (2.64) (-2.10) 
-0.0360 -0.0145  0.1175*** 0.0340  0.0812  0.1127  0.0410 0.1942**  0.0225  0.1152***  Joneses_5 
(-0.73) (-0.51) (3.70) (1.02)  (1.72)  (1.23) (1.00) (2.23) (0.16)  (3.44) 
-0.4511** -0.0925  0.2882  -0.9120 -0.7807**  0.0002  0.3795  0.7658  3.9534**  -0.9697*** constant 
(-2.41) (-0.51) (1.59) (-1.28) (-2.01)  (0.00)  (0.70)  (0.50)  (2.38)  (-4.66) 
Adj R-squares 0.9127 0.9382 0.8971  0.8025 0.9373 0.7971 0.9000 0.8540 0.8242 0.9637 
Observations  23 23 24 24 24  23  24 24 15  24 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating model (21) economy by economy. “lngdppc” is log per capita GDP, “mp” is propensity to 
imports, “F_open” is financial openness, “E-Vol” is exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is reserve volatility. “Joneses_5” is the Joneses variable 
defined as the sum of the reserve-to-GDP ratio of five 1997-98 crisis affected economies, which are Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines 
and Thailand. t-statistics are in parentheses. “***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 50
 Table D2.b: Results for individual economies with period-specified Joneses effects, with the crisis_5 economies as the Joneses 
 
  China India  Indonesia  Japan  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines Singapore Taiwan  Thailand 
0.0860** -0.0385  0.0391  0.0978 0.0647**  0.0222  -0.0954  0.0837 -0.6587**  0.1733***  lngdppc 
(2.46) (-1.02) (1.05) (1.50) (2.12)  (0.15) (-1.43) (0.54) (-2.64) (7.15) 
-0.3675 0.6704** 0.2864 0.7182** 0.3763*  0.2029  0.2816** -0.1905  1.9971*** 0.0526  mp 
(-1.44) (2.37) (1.53) (2.32) (1.92)  (1.22) (2.86)  (-1.59)  (3.74) (0.65) 
0.0695 0.5222 -0.0866  0.0184 -0.1528 -0.1550 0.0562 -0.0504 0.3601  0.2882***  F_open 
(0.23) (1.62) (-0.24)  (0.14) (-0.98) (-0.82) (1.39) (-0.80) (0.72)  (4.10) 
-0.0271 -0.0014 0.0000*  -0.0009  -0.0003*** -0.2115**  -0.0054 -0.5142 0.0601  -0.0080*** E_vol 
(-0.42) (-0.44) (2.11) (-0.78) (-3.46) (-2.14) (-1.60) (-0.74) (0.87)  (-3.27) 
0.0042*** 0.0097*** -0.0097  0.0013** 0.0080*** 0.0529*** 0.0265  0.0507**  0.0162**  -0.0001  R_vol 
(5.57) (6.93) (-0.86)  (2.68) (4.20) (4.46) (1.49) (2.85) (2.70) (-0.03) 
-0.0549 0.0043 -0.0382  -0.0177  -0.0053 -0.1818 -0.0015 0.0147 0.3843 -0.0396  Joneses_5 
(-1.02) (0.20) (-0.69)  (-0.41)  (-0.13) (-1.05) (-0.04) (0.10) (1.15) (-0.95) 
0.0543** 0.0322*** 0.0814*** 0.0345* 0.0853***  0.1590*  0.0591***  0.0837  -0.1784  0.0965***  I>97*Joneses_5
(2.71) (3.49) (3.18)  (1.77) (3.89) (1.95) (3.11) (1.46)  (-1.18) (4.45) 
-0.3835* 0.1752  -0.2146 -1.0322  -0.6123* -0.0492  0.6172  0.1704 5.4239**  -1.1423*** constant 
(-2.13) (0.89) (-1.00)  (-1.52)  (-2.11) (-0.04) (1.37) (0.11) (2.66) (-7.69) 
Adj. R-squares  0.9375 0.9500 0.9330  0.8247  0.9658 0.8273 0.9337 0.8631  0.8326 0.9828 
Observations  23 23 24  24 24 23 24 24 15 24 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating model (22) economy by economy. “lngdppc” is the log per capita GDP, “mp” is the import 
propensity, “F_open” is financial openness, “E_Vol” is exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is reserve volatility. “Joneses” is the Joneses variable 
defined as the sum of the reserve-to-GDP ratio of five 1997-98 crisis affected economies, which are Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines 
and Thailand. “I>97*Joneses_5” is the interactive Joneses variable I(t-1>97)*  ,1 it J − . t-statistics are in parentheses. “***”, “**”, and “*” denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  51
Table D3.a: Results from individual economies with the Joneses variable and the common GDP growth element 
 
 China  India  Indonesia  Japan  Korea  Malaysia  Philippine  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand 
0.0815 -0.0530 -0.0342  -0.0924** 0.0548  -0.1218  -0.0097  -0.0262 -0.5533** 0.0807**  lngdppc 
(1.70) (-0.72) (-0.86) (-2.36) (1.34) (-0.82) (-0.11) (-0.23) (-2.46) (2.46) 
-0.3938 0.9496** 0.4083 0.6336*** 0.8048*** 0.1984  0.2211 -0.2576** 1.5118** 0.1676*  mp 
(-1.19) (2.29) (1.57) (4.41) (4.47) (1.28) (1.44) (-2.55) (2.38) (1.76) 
-0.3108 -0.1140 -0.6185 0.0029  -0.5060*** 0.0294 0.1528*** -0.0572  0.1614 0.4548***  F_open 
(-0.81) (-0.37) (-1.28) (0.04) (-3.08) (0.16)  (3.96) (-1.08) (0.30)  (4.22) 
-0.0249 -0.0052  0.0001** -0.0001  -0.0005*** -0.2501**  -0.0066 -0.3496 -0.0113  -0.0114**  E_vol 
(-0.32) (-1.53) (2.38) (-0.13) (-5.42) (-2.57) (-1.61) (-0.53) (-0.23) (-2.85) 
0.0040*** 0.0104*** -0.0057  0.0005* 0.0049* 0.0434*** 0.0043 0.0363** 0.0146* -0.0039*  R_vol 
(4.33) (5.62) (-0.35) (1.96) (1.80) (4.14) (0.23) (2.53) (2.20) (-0.67) 
0.0342 0.0306 0.0383* 0.0738*** 0.0824** 0.0910** 0.0311  0.1621*** 0.0834 0.0688***  Joneses 
(0.77) (1.34) (2.10) (7.42) (2.57) (2.40) (1.61) (3.97) (0.66) (4.26) 
-0.1168 -0.0681** 0.0259  -0.0728  -0.2065*** -0.1760**  -0.0847 -0.0774 -0.0099  -0.1195**  PC_gdp-growth 
(-1.59) (-2.14) (0.32) (-3.42) (-3.67) (-2.16) (-1.71) (-0.73) (-0.05) (-2.70) 
-0.4159* 0.2067  0.1736 0.8080* -0.7453** 0.8957  0.0063  1.1903 4.7858** -0.6420***  constant 
(-1.89) (0.58) (0.80) (2.01) (-2.17) (0.86) (0.01) (1.04) (2.39) (-3.13) 
Adj R-squares  0.9191 0.9299 0.8604 0.9504 0.9576 0.8450 0.9063 0.8993 0.8118 0.9717 
Observations  23 23 24 24 24 23 24 24 15 24 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating model (21) economy by economy. “lngdppc” is log per capita GDP, “mp” is propensity to 
imports, “F_open” is financial openness, “E-Vol” is exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is reserve volatility. “Joneses” is the Joneses variable 
defined by equation (23) in the text. “PC_gdp_growth” is the principal component of the sample economies’ growth rates. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. “***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 52
 Table D3.b: Results for individual economies with period-specified Joneses effects and the common growth element 
 
  China India  Indonesia  Japan Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand 
0.0932** -0.0374  0.0654 -0.1213***  0.0266 -0.1210 -0.1751 -0.0249  -1.1154*** 0.1555***  lngdppc 
(2.21) (-0.57) (1.84) (-3.07) (0.84) (-0.78) (-1.84) (-0.20) (-4.37) (4.97) 
-0.2495 0.6922* 0.1994  0.7556*** 0.3476* 0.1998  0.4090** -0.2576** 1.0426* 0.0518  mp 
(-0.84) (1.81) (1.08) (4.81) (1.90) (1.24) (2.81) (-2.47) (2.17) (0.68) 
-0.0646 0.3443 -0.0585 0.0283 -0.2057 0.0177 0.0500 -0.0571 0.0963  0.3134***  F_open 
(-0.18) (1.02) (-0.16) (0.45) (-1.40) (0.08) (1.02) (-1.04) (0.25) (3.56) 
-0.0379 -0.0026  0.0001*** -0.0000 -0.0003*** -0.2435* -0.0063 -0.3428 0.1043* -0.0102***  E_vol 
(-0.56) (-0.81) (3.05) (-0.01) (-3.23) (-2.01) (-1.83) (-0.48) (1.94) (-3.42) 
0.0040*** 0.0098*** -0.0137  0.0006** 0.0031 0.0438*** 0.0244 0.0364** 0.0117* 0.0005  R_vol 
(4.93) (5.89) (-1.21) (2.41) (1.46) (3.71) (1.39) (2.35) (2.43) (0.11) 
-0.0401 0.0070 -0.0353  0.0947*** 0.0471* 0.0858 -0.0301 0.1596* 0.6577** 0.0045  Joneses 
(-0.80) (0.31) (-1.67) (6.56) (1.83) (1.30) (-1.10) (1.78) (2.96) (0.22) 
0.0126 -0.0175  0.1069*  -0.1059*** -0.0951*  -0.1650 0.0524 -0.0738 -0.2426 -0.0353  PC_gdp_growt
h  (0.15) (-0.49) (1.80) (-4.00) (-1.83) (-1.17) (0.81) (-0.46) (-1.50) (-0.89) 
0.0221** 0.0115** 0.0320*** -0.0092* 0.0300*** 0.0023 0.0286** 0.0011 -0.1706** 0.0256***  I>97*Joneses 
(2.36) (2.30) (4.35) (-1.89) (3.69) (0.10) (2.78) (0.03) (-2.82) (3.79) 
-0.3974* 0.1632 -0.3305 1.0611**  -0.3411 0.8957 1.1733* 1.1805  9.2433*** -1.0365***  constant 
(-2.06) (0.51) (-1.76) (2.67) (-1.22) (0.83) (1.80) (0.97) (4.35) (-5.64) 
Adj. R-squares  0.9372 0.9455 0.9341 0.9572 0.9763 0.8340 0.9341 0.8926 0.9055 0.9846 
Observations  23 23 24 24 24 23 24 24 15 24 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating model (22) economy by economy. “lngdppc” is the log per capita GDP, “mp” is the import 
propensity, “F_open” is financial openness, “E_Vol” is exchange volatility, and “R_vol” is reserve volatility. “Joneses” is the Joneses variable 
defined by equation (23) in the text. “PC_gdp_growth” is the principal component of the sample economies’ growth rates. “I>97*Joneses” is 
the interactive Joneses variable I(t-1>97)*  ,1 it J − . t-statistics are in parentheses. “***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
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